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The EU’s External Energy Policy Towards Azerbaijan: 
Success Or Failure? 
Bernd Weber  
2013 was a crucial year for energy relations between the EU 
and Azerbaijan, Europe’s key partner in the Caspian region. 
After a decade of ups and downs and a heated pipeline race, 
a Final Investment Decision (FID) has been reached on the 
Shah-Deniz phase II development (SD-II). It paves the way 
for Azerbaijani supplies of 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) per 
year, which will be shipped to Europe from 2019 on. These 
deliveries are considered to be the strategic “door opener” 
for the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, which is 
supposed to supply up to 20% of the EU ne
term.
1
 The corridor contributes to EU supply security by 
giving European consumers access to Caspian gas resources. 
Severe political and economic uncertainties with regard to 
the future of Russo-Ukrainian relations and repeated gas 
conflicts between Europe’s main supplier and the major 
transit state highlight the importance of the corridor. While 
EU officials hailed the FID as a breakthrough for EU supply 
security and a groundbreaking milestone of EU external 
energy policy towards Azerbaijan, three shortcomings put 
this appraisal into question. Firstly, contracted gas volumes 
represent only 2% of the gas consumption of the EU
Secondly, the strategic added value in terms of 
diversification of gas supplies for the most vulnerable 
consumers in Central and South East Europe remains 
limited. Thirdly, domestic reforms to integrate Azerbaijan 
into a common, pan-European gas market, based on liberal 
EU rules and norms have stalled. The question that arises is 
twofold: How successful has the EU external policy been 
towards its resource-rich neighbour and what are the 
remaining challenges and uncertainties for Euro
energy relations? 
 
The EU’s comprehensive approach to gas supply security
 
The EU’s import dependence on gas is supposed to 
to more than 80% by 2035.
3
 In order to deal with this 
structural dependence and the risk of potential cut
Brussels is aiming to reduce the EU’s vulnerability towards 
dominant suppliers and supply routes by diversification. The 
Southern Gas Corridor has become the EU’s major strategic 
                                                   
1 European Commission (2013) Gas from Azerbaijan: Commission 
welcomes final investment decision to extract gas pledged for Europe, 
Press Release. 
2 Calculation based on the “Policy Scenario” forecast for 2020 in: 
International Energy Agency (2013) World Energy Outlook 2013.
3 Ibid. 
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initiative in this context and Nabucco has become the 
flagship pipeline project within it. Indeed, the EU went far 
beyond the role it played in former infrastructure projects in 
terms of political, diplomatic, an
by prescribing the supplies, route and regulation of the 
corridor. The Commission pursued a multi
approach, which included multiple potential Central Asian 
and Middle Eastern suppliers, Azerbaijan being but one of 
them. Furthermore, it prioritised a specific supply route, 
along the “South Eastern Achilles’ heel” of European gas 
supply security, which runs through the Balkans up to 
Central Europe. Countries along this route are characterised 
by a high dependence on Russia
alternatives and have experienced the most severe supply 
cuts during former gas crises
beyond the strategic rationale of physical diversification, as 
it endowed the corridor with a liberal regulatory framework, 
based on EU norms, such as Third Party Access (TPA).
EU regulations were introduced to limit supplier control and 
transit risks within the corridor.
 
The second pillar of EU external energy policy towards 
Azerbaijan is embedded in the EU’s overall energy 
towards its neighbourhood. The EU seeks to integrate its 
neighbours in a pan-European energy market, based on EU 
norms, rules and standards. In this context, Brussels has 
multiplied its bilateral and multilateral instruments to export 
EU energy regulations, in order to liberalise and modernise 
the energy sectors of its neighbours. The unbundling of the 
gas sector, i.e. the separation of network operation from 
production and supply activities, is the linchpin of the EU
envisioned market restructuring.
unbundling and transparent market pricing are supposed to 
stimulate investment and depoliticize energy sectors, 
thereby contributing to EU supply security
 
 
 
                                                  
4 Pirani et al. (2009) The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 
2009: a comprehensive assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies. 
5 Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the Nabucco project, 
13/7/2009 
6 European Commission (2010) Commission Staff Working Paper on 
the Unbundling Regime. 
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Tacking stock – What has been achieved? 
 
While convergence with some technical norms and security 
standards has been achieved, convergence with EU key 
norms and rules is virtually absent. In 2006, Baku and 
Brussels signed a memorandum, which stipulates that the 
neighbouring country would reform energy tariffs, as well as 
establish an independent energy regulation authority and 
Transmission System Operator (TSO).
7
 However, no 
tangible progress has been made with regard to both market 
pricing and minimal unbundling. Furthermore, a Twinning 
programme between European and Azerbaijani experts on 
legal approximation and structural reforms has been carried 
out. Experts from both sides have prepared four draft laws in 
2010, but there is little hope that they will be adopted. 
 
Compared to other Eastern neighbours, such as Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia, convergence of Azerbaijan’s gas 
sector with EU norms is minimal. While supplier countries 
have arguably less interest in unbundling and market pricing, 
since this would affect the dominant role of their state-
owned energy companies and loosen their grip on an 
economically and politically sensitive sector, one wonders 
why Azerbaijan agreed to pursue reforms that aim for 
gradual convergence with EU legislation. Indeed, 
Azerbaijan formally committed to specific regulatory 
provisions, since it hoped to engage the EU in a wider and 
deeper strategic partnership, by accepting the EU’s 
convergence approach. Baku’s prior interest was to establish 
an outlet for Azerbaijani gas to Europe and to thereby pave 
the way for its development as a gas supplier in a 
geopolitically difficult environment. Western political and 
financial support was deemed to be crucial to achieve this 
objective. In the 90s, the US played this role with regard to 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the EU appeared 
to be the actor capable to assume it with regard to a strategic 
gas pipeline.  
 
For its part, Russia engaged on different levels to prevent 
Caspian gas from reaching its traditional markets in Central 
and South East Europe. Moscow tried to use its political and 
military support for the Armenian side in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict as leverage, sought to acquire strategic 
assets in Azerbaijan’s energy sector and purchase large 
volumes of SD-II gas. Furthermore, it signed memoranda 
with member states and Turkey to facilitate the South 
Stream project, which aimed at supplying the same 
destination markets as Nabucco, in order to make the 
project unnecessary. The Russian-Georgian War shed 
further doubt on Nabucco’s geopolitical fate and increased 
                                                   
7 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between 
the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of 
energy, 7/11/2006. 
Baku’s vital interest in a geostrategic partnership with the 
EU.  However, the more it became clear in the late 2000s, 
that the EU won’t be able to implement Nabucco, but 
continued nonetheless to give priority to the overambitious 
pipeline and neglected economically more feasible, smaller 
projects, the more convergence vanished from the Euro-
Azerbaijani energy agenda.  
 
While its opening is certainly an important achievement, the 
Southern Gas Corridor, as its stands today, reflects only 
partially the shape and features the EU was striving for. 
Instead of having one pipeline filled with gas from several 
suppliers, only Azerbaijani gas will reach Europe via Georgia 
and the Southern Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), Turkey and the 
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), before the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) brings it to Italy via Greece and 
Albania.  
 
Indeed, the EU managed to sign non-binding memoranda 
with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iraq to 
source additional gas, but this has not proven to be effective 
for three reasons. Firstly, private European import 
commitments were not sufficient in the eyes of producers. 
While the EU has developed a mechanism to aggregate 
demand in order to address this issue, flat overall EU gas 
demand became the major obstacle in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. Secondly, all suppliers are landlocked. The 
missing link is a pipeline that would enable Central Asian 
supplies to cross the Caspian and connect to Azerbaijani gas. 
In 2011, the Commission obtained an unprecedented 
mandate from the European Council to negotiate with 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans Caspian Pipeline 
(TCP). However, the status of the Caspian Sea remains a 
highly politicized conflict, which involves Russia and Iran, 
who have an interest in preventing the project. Iraq as an 
alternative supplier is still struggling with severe security 
issues, which are a major obstacle for pipeline-based 
supplies. Thirdly, while Russia has political and economic 
means to put pressure on Central Asian countries, the EU is 
still no significant player in the region.  
 
Confronted with the deadlock of the EU-promoted 
Nabucco project, Baku began to actively reconfigure the 
Southern Gas Corridor. By the early 2010s, Azerbaijan’s 
strategic and economic ambitions went beyond its initial role 
as mere crude exporter. With its traditional partner Turkey, 
Azerbaijan agreed on the construction and terms of 
TANAP, in which the Azerbaijani state company SOCAR 
holds a majority stake. This fait accompli made the Eastern 
part of Nabucco obsolete, put the non-European section of 
the Southern Gas Corridor under Azerbaijan’s control and 
left only the final decision on the routing on European 
territory open. The EU reacted by adopting a more neutral 
approach towards the competition between different 
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projects, from which TAP and a downscaled “Nabucco-
West” version with a capacity of 10 bcm emerged as final 
options for the EU section. Both projects were scalable and 
allowed for additional capacity between 10 and 15 bcm. 
Furthermore, TAP developed plans to supply also some 
destination markets in South East Europe, which was 
partially a response to EU demands.  
 
Behind the scenes, particularly the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) firmly supported the Nabucco-West 
option, however, the EU was not able to influence the Final 
Investment Decision in its favour. TAP does not ease 
Central and South Eastern Europe’s dependency on Russian 
supplies sufficiently. Azerbaijan’s choice of TAP was 
certainly influenced by economic considerations and its 
successful acquisition of additional strategic assets in the 
distribution and transmission sector along the route. In the 
context of privatisations during the Euro Crisis, SOCAR 
secured a majority stake in the Greek gas transmission 
operator DESFA.  
 
With regard to the regulatory framework of the Southern 
Gas Corridor as well, not much is left of the EU’s initial 
ambitions. The Commission drafted an Intergovernmental 
Agreement (IGA) for Nabucco, which provided for Third 
Party Access for 50% of the supply volumes.
8
 Its signing by 
all consumer and transit countries was considered to be a 
political and diplomatic breakthrough and the framework 
was presented as a model for future projects. The agreed 
provisions would have reduced the influence of energy 
producing countries and upstream companies along the 
whole route. However, the document is now obsolete. 
While the TANAP IGA is inspired by the Nabucco IGA, it 
does not provide for Third Party Access.
9
 Furthermore, 
TAP was granted exemptions from the TPA regime for the 
entire initial capacity of 10 bcm for a period of 25 years.
10
  
 
Remaining challenges and uncertainties 
 
The last decade has clearly shown the limits of EU external 
energy policy towards Azerbaijan. The EU’s efforts to 
promote structural reforms and regulatory convergence with 
EU legislation have largely failed to produce tangible results 
in Azerbaijan’s gas sector. With regard to convergence, EU 
external energy policy should now focus on other fields, 
such as energy efficiency and renewables. Reforms in both 
                                                   
8 Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the Nabucco project, 
13/7/2009 
9 Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the Trans Anatolian 
Natural Gas Pipeline System, 26/6/2012. 
10 European Commission (2013) Commission Decision on the 
exemption of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline from the requirements on 
third party access, tariff regulation and ownership unbundling. 
fields seem more feasible and could help to make more gas 
available for exports and thereby contribute indirectly to EU 
energy security. As to the further diversification of corridor 
supplies, it is highly questionable, whether other Central 
Asian producers will join Azerbaijan and supply gas to 
Europe in the mid-term. While the EU should continue to 
negotiate with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans 
Caspian Pipeline, Azerbaijan will probably opt to expand 
TANAP and fill the additional capacity with indigenous gas 
from fields like Absheron. Thus, the pipeline does not seem 
to be an infrastructure link available for other regional or 
Eastern Mediterranean suppliers. Finally, it remains to be 
seen, how much Azerbaijani gas will be available for the 
most vulnerable Central and South East European countries, 
since the bulk of the initial volumes is earmarked for the 
well-diversified Italian market. After the “death” of its 
flagship project Nabucco, the EU should now cooperate 
with Baku and TAP and firmly support interconnections, 
such as the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), which would 
permit Azerbaijani gas to reach the Central and South East 
European network. 
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Carbon Pricing in a Time of Uncertainty 
Johanna Grusch  
Uncertainty is a recurring theme in today’s debates on future 
energy sources, their prices and their security of supply due 
to the inherent unpredictability within the energy sector. 
The beginning of the 21st century was marked by several 
rapid transformations resulting from unforeseen economic, 
political as well as technological developments that impacted 
global energy markets. In order to achieve security of energy 
supply, this essay argues that political and economic 
flexibility is crucial for energy providers and consumers in 
order to adapt to the uncertainties and unpredictable 
changes in global energy structures. When putting energy 
security in the context of environmental sustainability, this 
flexibility imperative supports arguments in favour of carb
pricing mechanisms, such as carbon taxing and trading 
schemes.  
In addition to providing a neutral policy instrument in order 
to incentivize the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
such market based instruments also protect the freedom to 
choose whichever technology economic actors perceive as 
most cost-effective. They therefore allow energy suppliers 
and consumers to adapt to unpredictable and unknowable 
changes quicker and more cost-effectively. However, even 
though different systems of carbon taxation and trading exist 
and already provide a higher degree of flexibility, these 
systems themselves entail inherent instability and have not 
been able to generate the required reduction in carbon 
emissions. What is needed is a restructuring, stabilisation 
and strengthening of carbon pricing mechanisms that equip 
energy providers and consumers with sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to a changing energy market and as a consequence, to 
achieve both security of energy supply and the mitigation of 
climate change. 
The need for flexibility 
Looking back over the last decade, several developments 
impacting global energy structures have occurred that could 
not have been predicted by policy makers or market 
participants in advance. In addition to technological 
advances allowing for instance for the US shale gas 
revolution (IHS CERA 2010), various unforeseeable 
political factors have significantly reshaped energy markets. 
The Russo-
 
 
on 
Besides widespread political turmoil in the oil
world (Maher 2013), for instance, political u
stemming from Russia and the willingness of its leaders to 
use energy markets as instruments for political leverage, 
contribute to the level of uncertainty in Europe’s energy 
supply.  
Moreover, the combination of technological and political 
insecurity has rendered the nuclear power sector subject to 
major transformations. While the incidents in Fukushima led 
to a moratorium of nuclear power stations in Germany and a 
resulting increase in the use of highly carbon
energy sources, the UK is still strongly committed to using 
nuclear power in order to reach its emission reduction 
targets, mitigate climate change and increase its energy 
independence. The costs of nuclear power, however, can no 
longer be carried by private investors alone, ne
major government investments, such as a £16 Billion deal 
with EDF to build two reactors at Hinkley Point in 
Somerset (Froggatt 2013).  
In the UK, and in Europe, these developments have led to a 
return of centralised energy planning. As Robinson
highlights, the resulting re-politicisation of energy markets 
adds another layer of uncertainty, resulting in a demand for 
a ‘political uncertainty premium’ for investments. However, 
whether the political efforts to secure energy supplies while 
mitigating climate change will be successful, is as 
unforeseeable as the aforementioned developments. In fact, 
the impact of climate change on our environment itself 
remains not predictable. While documents like the Stern 
Review (2007) warn against the danger
temperature increases beyond 2°C and call for immediate 
action to avoid reaching a dangerous threshold of carbon 
concentrations of more than 450 parts per million, others 
point to the sheer impossibility of measuring the impact of a 
plethora of factors changing global temperature levels 
(Robinson 2013, Helm 2012). 
The recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (2013), which records a slowdown in 
temperature increases, further adds to the uncertainty. In 
combination with diverging national interests, capabilities, 
responsibilities and climate change impacts, this increases 
the difficulty of establishing an international agreement that 
would determine who will contribute how much to which 
level of climate change mitigation. It 
surprising that the World Energy Forum states an 
international climate agreement as the most uncertain of all 
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